Exclusive Hiring Halls In The Construction Industry by Manson, Alexander
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 2 Article 6 
1-1-1960 
Exclusive Hiring Halls In The Construction Industry 
Alexander Manson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Alexander Manson, Exclusive Hiring Halls In The Construction Industry, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 355 (1960). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss2/6 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
EXCLUSIVE HIRING HALLS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Congress, in 1947, enacted the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act),' which was a substantial revision of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (Wagner Act) ,2 the basic legislation in the labor area.
One of the prime targets for correction was the closed shop permitted
under the old Wagner Act. The closed shop makes the union the exclusive
agency which supplies manpower to an employer and requires that a person
must be a union member as a condition precedent to employment.3 Section
8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act prohibiting employers from discriminating
against employees in order to encourage or discourage union membership,
was aimed at prohibiting the closed shop by allowing no form of union
security agreement other than the union shop.4
The Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board and gave
it exclusive jurisdiction over the rights created and duties imposed by the
act upon management and labor.5 The Labor Board's jurisdiction and
authority was carried forward into the Taft-Hartley Act with some modifi-
cations not here relevant. Before 1947 the Labor Board had refused to take
jurisdiction in cases involving the construction industry for a variety of
possible reasons.6 It may have felt the industry lacked effect upon inter-
state commerce, or that it was essentially a migratory type of employment
which would make designation of a bargaining unit extremely difficult. The
Labor Board reversed its policy after 1947 presumably compelled by the
feeling that Congress intended to change certain abuses in the construction
industry.7 The Board stated in Wadsworth Building Company, "We be-
lieve, as we have on other occasions indicated, that it would effectuate
the policies of this Act and accord with Congressional intent to assert juris-
diction over cases such as this though involving the local construction in-
dustry, where interference therewith would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. As legislative history shows, Congress, in enacting
Section 8(b) (4) (A), as well as other provisions of the act, intended, among
other things, to reach certain practices prevailing in the construction industry
1. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
2. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 155-66.
3. Report of the President, Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of
the Building and Construction Trades Department of AFL, 129 (1950).
4. § 8(A)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act exempts the union shop from its proscription:
11... Provided, that nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein
on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later. . ....
5. Supra note 2, § 153.
6. Brown & Root, 51 N.L.R.B. 820 (1943).
7. Wadsworth Building Company, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
which it deemed were detrimental to the public interest and which it
expected to eliminate thereby."38
Bringing' the construction industry under the purview of the Taft-
Hartley Act meant that the traditional closed shop prevailing therein would
have to be modified to accord with Section 8(A)(3) (the employer dis-
crimination clause), which prohibits the closed shop. The unions and em-
ployers in the industry then resorted to a form of contract whereby the
union was made the exclusive hiring agency, but employment was not
conditioned upon union membership and the employer had the right to reject
any laborers sent by the union. This arrangement is known in the industry
as the exclusive hiring hall system.9 The union acts as an employment process-
ing department in addition to being a bargaining agent. The hiring hall assured
to the contractor a ready supply of experienced labor and a convenient method
of processing such labor.") The courts have upheld the validity of this mode
of hiring as not violative of the employer discrimination clause, absent acts of
discrimination on the part of the employer, induced by the union in order to
encourage membership.'"
A recent case in the Ninth Circuit, N.L.R.B. v. Swinerton,12 over-
ruled the position maintained by the Labor Board, that an exclusive hiring hall
contract, without guarantees against discrimination, was illegal per se. The
court followed N.L.R.B. v. Contrail,l 3 holding that an employer violates the
employer discrimination clause of the act if he requires membership in a labor
organization precedent to employment. It went on to say, "A referral
system without guarantees of non-discrimination is not per se illegal. Such a
rule would in practical effect shift the burden of proof on the question of dis-
crimination from the General Counsel of the Board to the respondent. Such
a referral system does not violate the act absent evidence of actual discrimi-
nation."'14 This reasoning was in line with the Board's own position upon this
point as was revealed in Hunkin-Conkley Construction Company, where the
Board stated, inter alia, "Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that the respondent
company and the respondent unions had entered into such an agreement, we
have not found a provision that personnel be secured through the offices of a
union violative of the act, absent evidence that the union unlawfully discrimi-
nated in supplying the company with personnel."'' 5
The exclusive hiring hall contract was more or less accepted by the Board
until its decision in Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Con-
8. Id. at 804.
9. Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
10. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess. 155 (1951).
11. Hunkin-Conklyn Const. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 433 (1951).
12. 202 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1953).
13. 201 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1953).
14. Supra note 12 at 515.
15. Supra note 11 at 435.
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tractors.16 The Board, in that case, held the language of the exclusive hiring
contract violated the act upon its face and tended to unlawfully encourage
union membership. The pertinent provisions of the exclusive hiring hall clause
read, "(a) The recruitment of employees shall be the responsibility of the
union and it shall maintain offices or other designated facilities for the con-
venience of the employers when in need of employees and for workmen when
in search of employment. The employers will call upon the local union in
whose territory the work is to be accomplished to furnish qualified workmen
in the classifications herein contained. Should a shortage of workmen exist
and the employer has placed orders for men with the union, orally or written,
and they cannot be supplied by the union within 48 hours, the employer may
procure workmen from other sources."1 7
The Board took the position that this contract was illegal irrespective of
actual discriminatory hiring practices or illegal pressures proscribed by the
Taft-Hartley Act. Thus the Board interpreted the contract in the light of the
employer discrimination clause to be an unlawful method to encourage mem-
bership in a labor organization. It reasoned thus, "The contract or hiring
arrangement need not explicitly limit employment to union members to be
unlawful. The statutory phrase 'encourage membership in a labor organization,'
is not minutely restricted to enrollment on the union books; rather, it neces-
sarily embraces also encouragement towards compliance with obligations of
union membership and participation in union activities generally."'-8
In taking the above position the Labor Board purported to follow the
general rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Radio Officer's Union v.
N.L.R.B.,19 a leading decision construing the employer discrimination clause
of the Taft-Hartley Act. This decision was a consolidation of three cases
with three different fact situations, all revolving around a construction
of the employers' discrimination clause. In one set of facts the union prevailed
upon the employer to reduce an employee's seniority for failure to pay his dues.
The second was a case where the union refused clearance for a radio operator
to work on a ship because he failed to comply with established hiring hall
procedures of the union, and the company hired another man sent by the union
solely because of union demands. The third case involved a bargaining unit
which induced the employer to pay union members a wage increase to the
exclusion of non-union members where the union was the bargaining agent of
all employees of that particular company. In holding that these fact situations
showed violations of the employer discrimination clause, the Supreme Court
elucidated as follows, "We read the language . . . to mean that subjective
evidence of employee response was not contemplated by the drafters, and to
accord with our holding that such proof is not required where encouragement
16. 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 41 LRRMT 1460 (1958).
17. Id. at 894.
18. 41 LRRM 1460, 1462.
19. 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
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or discouragement can reasonably be inferred from the nature of the dis-
crimination.
"Encouragement and discouragement are subtle things requiring a high
degree of introspective perception, Labor Board v. Donnelly Garment Company.
... But... it is common experience that the desire of employees to unionize
is raised or lowered by the advantage thought to be obtained by such action.
Moreover, the act does not require that the employees discriminated against
be the ones encouraged for purposes of violation of Section 8(A) (3). Nor
does the act require that this change in employees' quantum of desire to join
a union have immediate manifestations. '20
On the basis of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Radio Officer's Union
v. N.L.R.B.,2 from which the preceding quotation was taken, the Board felt
it could infer a tendency to illegal encouragement from the mere fact of an
exclusive hiring hall or referral system established by contract between the
union and employer's association absent specific provisions for non-discrimi-
nation.
The Board set out in brief form its opinion on what would be required
in an exclusive hiring hall contract to pass the test of Mountain Pacific. The
basic non-discrimination clauses must embody "... (1) Selection of applicants
for referral to jobs shall be on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be
based on, or in any way affected by, union membership, by-laws, rules, regu-
lations, constitutional provisions, or any other aspect or obligation of union
memberships, policies, or requirements. (2) The employer retains the right
to reject any job applicant referred by the union. (3) The parties to the
agreement post in places where notices to employees and applicants for employ-
ment are customarily posted, all provisions relating to the functioning of the
hiring arrangement, including the safeguards that we deem essential to the
legality of an exclusive hiring agreement."22
The very existence of an exclusive hiring hall agreement might tend to
encourage union membership, but the Board felt that this would be a valid
encouragement. They realized that Section 8(A) (3) did not intend to proscribe
all conduct between the employer and union which had a tendency to encourage
union membership. They expressed this view thus, "However, appraisal of
the statute as a whole and the large body of decisional law based upon it,
shows that there are many literal forms of encouragement to union member-
ships that are not prohibited. The better representation a union affords, the
more successful it is in wresting economic advantage from the employer for
the employees, the more it will attract members to it; i.e., 'encourage union
memberships.' Clearly such encouragement alone does not always violate Section
8(A) (3) ; a line must be drawn between lawful and unlawful encouragement." 23
20. Id. at 51.
21. Supra note 19.
22. Supra note 18 at 1462.
23. Supra note 16 at 897-98.
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Member Murdock dissented from the position taken by the Board on
what constitutes a valid exclusive hiring hall contract. He felt that the hiring
hall contract, without the above enumerated guarantees was not invalid per se
as held by the Board, stating that this had been the Board's position for the
past 7 years, and had been approved by every circuit court of appeals which
passed upon the issue. Murdock also alluded to the point that Senator Taft
himself had stated the provision proscribing the closed shop was not aimed
at-hiring halls such as were used in the maritime industry. Here the majority
was invalidating a contract which the author of the bill, the courts, Congress,
and previous board cases had held to be perfectly legal.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit passed upon the
Board's decision in Mountain Pacific,24 and ruled that it had erroneously inter-
preted Section 8 (A) (3) by deciding that the contract was invalid upon its face.
The Court ruled that absent proof of discrimination an exclusive hiring hall ar-
rangement was valid without a specific clause in it requiring non-discrimination.
They relied upon their previous decision in N.L.R.B. v. Swinerton 2 5 and other
Board cases to show such a contract was not the kind aimed at by Section
8(A) (3) and was a valid form of union encouragement under the doctrine of
Radio Officers v. N-L.R.B. The purpose of the act being, under the Radio
Officers case "to insulate employees' job rights from their organizational
rights."2 6
But the Court in Mountain Pacific did not merely direct the Board to
give effect to existing law, it stated that it could see no reason why, for future
cases, it could not give special significance to the fact that an exclusive hiring
hall contract did not contain provisions against discrimination. Thus the Board
could shift the burden of proof from the General Counsel to the respondents
to prove there was no discrimination in the operation of the contract.
This position of the Court of Appeals is placed in the setting of a contract
in which no anti-discriminatory clauses are found. The Board, under its power
to fashion its own rules of evidence as the common law courts do, from case
to case may presume discrimination and place the burden of proof on the
respondents to affirmatively show otherwise. This is, in effect, accepting the
Board position, for it would be extremely more burdensome for an employer
and a union to prove that they did not discriminate in the first instance than
to refute charges of discrimination based upon specific facts. In reality, the
better path would be to include in exclusive hiring hall contracts the clauses
required by the Board than run the risk of having to prove on trial the fact
of a non-discriminatory hiring hall.
It is submitted, however, that a rigid application of the Board's Mountain
Pacific doctrine to the construction industry is not justified, in the first place,
24. 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
25. Supra note 12.
26. Supra note 19 at 52.
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because of the peculiar conditions prevailing in that industry. As stated by
the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Management Relations, these conditions
are:
"(1) Each employer constructs on numerous separate projects each year.
"(2) Until a project is started he has no manual employees.
"(3) On each project there are usually several employers frequently using
different crafts of workmen.
"(4) On each project there is a constant shifting of crews on and off the
job as work progresses.
"(5) In each crew there are frequent changes in the men when the crew
returns to the job.
"(6) There is not a time on the job when all men and all crews eventually
employed will be so employed at the same time.
"(7) The workmen are drawn from an area pool of available workmen
who will work for many or all employers in the area, or may drift from one
area pool to another area pool.
"(8) When a workman's function on a job is temporarily finished they are
laid off and returned to the pool for use on other jobs or by other construction
employers.
"(9) A vast number of projects in the industry are of a few days' or hours'
duration for a given craft.
"(10) This quick need and rapid shifting of men in and out of the pool
to various projects requires a previous established and uniform understanding
of employment terms for all jobs and for all contractors in order to avoid
delays in hiring and misunderstandings as to the terms of employment.
"(11) Each employer's policy as to wages and working conditions must be
comparable to that of other employers of men in the pool. '27
In view of the above conditions, some arrangement such as a union hiring
hall must be maintained if the basic advantages, to the worker, of union
organization are to be had. Two of the most important are the acquiring of
seniority rights and some type of job security which extends beyond any given
employer. One of the most prized possessions of a worker is seniority, and
if the construction worker cannot acquire it at the hiring hall phase, he will
not have it at all, for there are no feasible methods of acquiring seniority with
a given employer given the essentially necessary transitory nature of employ-
ment with any given construction company2 8 The policy behind the Taft-
Hartley Act could not have been to deny to construction workers the minimum
of security provided by the exclusive hiring hall contract, by requiring the
company be always free to reject a worker, without cause, referred to it by
the union hall.
27. Supra note 10 at 145.
28. Sherman, Legal Status in Hiring Process, 47 Geo. L.J. 203 (1958).
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The L.M.R.A. was not passed by Congress as a reaction to the construction
industry and particularly its own peculiar closed shop. This legislation was
meant to abolish the closed shop of the factory, not of the building unions.
The N.L.R.B. could have administratively refused to apply the Taft-Hartley
proscription in its literal form to the exclusive hiring hall, but the board chose
to enforce it literally with consequent confusion and instability created.20
When Congress enacts legislation for the N.L.R.B. to implement, of necessity,
it leaves a good measure of discretion to the Board in applying such legislation
to varied social and economic conditions. In a field so broad, all encompassing,
diversified and complex as labor and management relations, subtlety of mind,
unity of basic purpose, and an intelligent grasp of the general object and policy
behind the banning of the closed shop are required for successful and rational
implementation of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board's job is to reduce this
policy to working rules, evolved from case to case, striking a rational, coherent,
and feasible balance between literal application of the Congressional command
and a reasonable evaluation of exactly which objective conditions were aimed
at and what result was expected. When the Board applies the closed shop
proscription wholesale and indiscriminately to almost all exclusive union
referral systems, as evidenced by its post Mountain Pacific decisions, 30 it abdi-
cates its quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions and reduces itself to a
mere fact finding board which the Supreme Court, in the Radio Officers case,31
emphatically stated it was not. But the variance between the explicitly stated
rationale of agency action and its underlying basic motives being at times so
unrelated,3 2 the critical conclusion stated probably is an oversimplification.
The recent passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill effected an amendment
to Section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 33 which recognized some
of the unique conditions of the construction industry enumerated above. A new
subsection "f" was enacted, applying specifically to the construction industry.
The "grace period" for becoming a union member was shortened from thirty
to seven days; 34 a contract calling for union referral of job applicants is ex-
pressly permitted, and unions and employers are now permitted to provide in
their contracts for a system of priority in selecting job applicants according to
length of service with an employer or in the geographical area. Seemingly,
this added provision would allow the characteristic hiring hall arrangement
of the industry. On close analysis, however, it is noted that while contracts
in the industry may be entirely in compliance with the new subsection, the
Board may still apply its Mountain Pacific criteria, since management is still
29. Impact of Taft-Hartley Upon Building and Construction Industry, 60 Yale LJ.
673 (1951).
30. Local 357, Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 121 N.L.R.B. 1629 (1958).
31. Supra note 19 at 48.
32. Schwaztz, Comparative Television and the Chancellors Foot, 47 Geo. LJ. 655
(1958). See also Jaffe, "The Scandal in T.V. Licensing," Harpers, Sept. 1957, p. 77.
33. Labor-Management Reform Act of 1959, P.L. 86, 86th Cong., S. 1555.
34. Supra note 4.
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not free to contract away its employment prerogatives. Any question on this
point which may arise from the reading of the new provision is quickly dis-
pelled by reference to the report of the House and ,Senate Conference Com-
mittee on the bill. 11 ... Nothing in such provision is intended to restrict the
applicability of the hiring hall provisions enunciated in the Mountain Pacific
case (119 N.L.R.B. 883, 893)... .'3 The task of properly implementing the
basic objectives of the Act remains the province of the Board. In the hiring
hall area, the task cannot be considered complete by simply following the rula
of .Mountaiii Pacific.
ALmcADER MANSoN
ANNER OF PUBLICATION DETERMINATIVE OF ACTION FOR INVASION 01
PRIVACY
It is the accepted procedure, and rightly so, that any discussion of the
right of privacy start with a reference to the law review article by Warren
and Brandeis which has been widely acknowledged to be the birthplace of the
right of privacy.' Prior to the publication of the article, no right of privacy
was recognized by the common law. It was the purpose of the authors to con-
sider whether the then existing law afforded a principle which could properly
be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual, and, if it did, to determine
the nature and extent of such protection.2 They concluded that the law afforded
such a principle.3 New York, the first state to consider the existence of the
right, rejected its existence.4 Shortly thereafter, however, Georgia held such
a right existed and,5 currently, over twenty states recognize and protect the
right of privacy, while three states, including New York, have adopted a limited
statutory right of privacy.6
It is not surprising that the existence of the right received such ready
recognition. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis said that "Of the desirability-
indeed of the necessity-of some such protection, there can, it ii believed, be
no doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. " r Those same abuses exist today, and, along with
technical advances in the field of communications, and the willingness of the
courts to recognize a cause of action for mental disturbance, account for the
rapid, and almost inevitable,8 growth of the right of privacy.
Today the courts are no longer faced with the problem of the existence
35. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 3186 (1959).
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2. Id. at 197.
3. Id. at 206.
4. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
5. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
6. Prosser, Torts, 636-637 (2d ed. 1955) ; see N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51.
7. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
8. 1 Harper and James, Torts, § 683 (1956).
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